Abstract: This work investigates the relationship between electoral incentives and voter preferences in Nigeria, using the 2015 Bayelsa governorship election as a case study. The study found that political elites capitalize on the heterogeneity of the Nigerian society to manipulate the electorate by prying on the primordial sentiments of groups as well as vulnerabilities to illegally motivate voters to curry support during elections. The study also found that although explicit economic incentives are common feature in Nigerian elections, it is altruistic incentives such as group identity priming and party loyalty that motivate electorates to vote rather than societal objectives based on the candidate’s policies and projects. There is also the case of outright vote buying that has characterized the Nigerian electoral system. This study therefore established a very strong relationship between electoral incentives and voter preference. It is therefore recommended that the three arms of government in Nigeria should work together to ensure that all forms of monetary inducements by candidates are treated as serious offences and punished appropriately.