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Original Research Article

Strengthening Saudi Arabia's Corporate Debt Market under Vision 2030: A CFO Framework for Issuer Readiness, Debt Structuring, Liquidity Planning, and Governance

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Abstract: Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 requires a deeper corporate debt market capable of financing diversification, infrastructure, technology, tourism, manufacturing and energy transition without excessive dependence on bank balance sheets or public funding. This review develops a chief financial officer framework for issuer readiness, debt structuring, liquidity planning and governance. It synthesises regulatory reports, market evidence and corporate finance research published between 2020 and 2025. The review finds that market development depends not only on additional issuance, but on a larger pipeline of credible repeat issuers, transparent pricing, diversified maturities, stronger secondary-market liquidity and governance arrangements that protect debtholders. At company level, readiness begins with a defensible financing purpose, audited cash-flow visibility, covenant capacity, rating preparedness and board-approved risk limits. Structuring should match instrument type, currency, tenor, amortisation, security package and sustainability features to the asset and cash-flow profile rather than to short-term pricing alone. Liquidity planning must integrate minimum cash, committed facilities, maturity ladders, stress testing and refinancing triggers. Governance must connect the board, treasury, risk, legal, investor relations and Shariah oversight where applicable. Its application can improve issuer resilience, broaden institutional participation and support a more liquid Saudi corporate bond and sukuk market.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Corporate Debt Market, Sukuk, Bonds, Issuer Readiness, Liquidity Planning, Capital Structure, Corporate Governance, Vision 2030.

1. INTRODUCTION

Saudi Arabia's economic transformation is generating unusually large and varied financing requirements. Vision 2030 programmes are expanding non-oil sectors, developing new industrial clusters and accelerating private investment, while fiscal authorities continue to emphasise spending quality and medium-term sustainability [1-7]. A mature corporate debt market is therefore not a peripheral capital-market objective. It is an essential transmission mechanism through which domestic savings, institutional portfolios and international capital can fund productive corporate investment without concentrating risk in banks or the sovereign balance sheet. The Saudi market has expanded its listed sukuk and bond infrastructure, disclosure architecture and issuance calendar, yet the development challenge is broader than market size.

Annual and quarterly market reports show a platform with growing activity, but still characterised by concentrated issuance, variable trading depth and a limited population of frequent corporate borrowers [2–5]. The core policy question is consequently how to move from episodic transactions by large or government-linked entities towards a repeatable market in which a wider range of financially sound companies can issue across tenors and risk categories.

A company enters the market only after the chief financial officer and board have translated strategy into a credible financing requirement, demonstrated cash-flow capacity, selected an appropriate instrument, accepted continuing disclosure obligations and established a plan for debt service and refinancing. Strong preparation can diversify funding, extend tenor, preserve bank lines, improve capital discipline and create a pricing benchmark for future issuance. Recent GCC research confirms that leverage decisions are shaped by profitability, size, liquidity, ownership, asset tangibility, Shariah compliance and information asymmetry [12–21]. These characteristics mean that frameworks derived from deep Western bond markets cannot simply be transferred to Saudi Arabia. Concentrated ownership, family control, state participation, Islamic instruments and rapidly changing regulatory expectations alter both the demand for debt and the signals conveyed by an issue.

This review addresses that gap by developing a CFO-centred framework connecting four capabilities: issuer readiness, debt structuring, liquidity planning and governance. It also identifies market-level actions that can increase the supply of investable securities, improve price discovery and support long-term legacy value under Vision 2030. The argument is that sustainable market depth arises when regulation, infrastructure and investor demand are matched by corporate institutions capable of issuing responsibly and repeatedly.

2. Aim, Objectives and Analytical Scope

The aim of this review is to explain how Saudi companies can become reliable debt-market issuers and how that issuer capability can contribute to national market development. The focus is non-financial corporates because their financing choices determine whether capital-market funding reaches the productive sectors targeted by economic diversification. Banks remain important investors, arrangers and liquidity providers, but their own capital structures and prudential constraints require a different analytical treatment. First, it identifies the financial, organisational and disclosure conditions that should be satisfied before a company approaches the bond or sukuk market. Second, it evaluates how a CFO should choose among bank loans, private placements, public bonds, sukuk, commercial paper and sustainability-labelled structures. Third, it integrates treasury liquidity management with issuance strategy, recognising that debt service, refinancing and contingent liquidity determine whether a transaction remains sustainable after closing. Fourth, it defines governance arrangements that align directors, executives, investors, trustees, Shariah advisers and regulators throughout the life of an instrument.

The review distinguishes market readiness from issuer readiness. Market readiness concerns listing rules, settlement, investor access, benchmark curves, intermediaries, disclosure standards and secondary trading. Issuer readiness concerns the individual company's capacity to satisfy those conditions without weakening its operating resilience. The analytical boundary includes conventional bonds and Shariah-compliant sukuk issued domestically or internationally by Saudi companies. It also covers private debt and short-term instruments where they form part of a maturity ladder or provide a bridge to public issuance. Sovereign borrowing is treated as contextual because the government's issuance programme supports benchmark pricing and investor-market development, but sovereign debt management is not the subject of the proposed corporate framework [5-7].

The review adopts the CFO perspective because financing decisions must remain connected to strategy, operations and governance. An arranger can optimise execution, a legal adviser can document covenants and a rating agency can assess credit risk, but only management and the board can determine whether the debt is economically justified, operationally serviceable and consistent with long-term risk appetite.

3. REVIEW METHODOLOGY

A structured integrative review was undertaken to combine market reports, regulatory material and peer-reviewed corporate finance research. The review period was limited to 2020–2025 to capture reforms, financing conditions and empirical evidence relevant to the present phase of Vision 2030. Sources were identified through combinations of the terms Saudi Arabia, GCC, corporate debt, bond market, sukuk, capital structure, cash holdings, liquidity, debt maturity, corporate governance, disclosure and issuer readiness. Documents were included when they provided evidence on at least one of five domains: Saudi debt-market development; GCC corporate financing behaviour; debt structure and maturity;

liquidity and refinancing risk; or governance and debtholder protection. Official documents were retained where they contained market statistics, regulatory priorities, fiscal context or issuance guidance. Academic studies were retained where the research design, variables and institutional setting could inform CFO decisions [19]. Sources outside the date range, purely promotional commentary and papers without a clear connection to corporate funding were excluded.

The final evidence base contained exactly thirty references. Official reports describe the market's operating environment, while academic evidence explains why firms with different profitability, ownership, liquidity and asset profiles choose different leverage and payout policies. Comparative market studies contribute lessons on issuer access, bondholder rights and secondary liquidity [8–11]. Synthesis proceeded in three stages. First, findings were coded against the four CFO capabilities. Second, recurring mechanisms were compared across sources, including information asymmetry, collateral capacity, internal funding preference, rating discipline, maturity concentration and governance quality. Third, the mechanisms were translated into decision gates, metrics and board responsibilities. The review therefore develops a mechanism-based framework that preserves the context and limitations of each source.

Observations from GCC samples were not treated as identical to Saudi outcomes, and findings from banks or foreign markets were used only when the underlying mechanism was transferable. The attached reference paper informed the organisation of the review and the use of a clearly staged conceptual framework, but its 2026 publication date meant that it was excluded from the thirty-source evidence set. This maintained full compliance with the specified 2020–2025 citation boundary.

4. Saudi Corporate Debt-Market Context

Saudi Arabia enters the next phase of debt-market development with several structural advantages. The economy has large institutional pools of capital, a sovereign issuer capable of supporting a domestic yield curve, sophisticated banks, an established sukuk tradition and policy commitment to expanding capital-market financing. The Financial Sector Development Program and capital-market authorities have also prioritised product breadth, investor participation, technology and regulatory quality [1, 2]. However, corporate debt markets do not deepen automatically when sovereign issuance grows. Sovereign instruments can establish reference yields and operational routines, but companies still face credit differentiation, documentation costs, rating requirements and investor scrutiny. The Saudi Exchange's market reports indicate the importance of distinguishing outstanding value from actual liquidity [3,4]. A market can display substantial listed value while individual instruments trade infrequently, leaving investors dependent on dealer quotes and reducing the reliability of secondary pricing.

Large, highly rated or government-related entities can access public markets efficiently, whereas mid-sized companies may lack audited track records, treasury capability, ratings familiarity or the transaction scale needed to absorb fixed issuance costs. Comparative evidence shows that corporate bond markets often remain dominated by large issuers even after regulatory infrastructure improves [8]. GCC companies have traditionally relied heavily on relationship banking, short-term facilities and internally generated cash. Research on Gulf leverage finds that profitability, size and asset tangibility materially influence financing choices [12-26]. Relationship loans offer confidentiality and amendment flexibility, but excessive dependence on them concentrates refinancing risk and can shorten maturities. Public debt can extend tenor and diversify providers, yet introduces disclosure, covenant and market-access obligations that some owners may initially resist.

Islamic finance adds depth but also structuring complexity. Shariah-compliant status can affect leverage decisions, investor access and the legal form of financing [16]. Sukuk may appeal to a broad regional investor base and align with established Saudi practice, but the transaction must connect economic exposure, asset arrangements, cash-flow rights and documentation in a manner that is both commercially efficient and religiously acceptable. The 2024 Article IV assessment described strong non-oil activity alongside the need to manage investment intensity and fiscal pressures [7]. Higher global rates, volatile credit spreads and large capital programmes increase the value of pre-funding, diversified maturities and committed liquidity. The strongest strategy is creating issuers that can access debt through cycles while preserving investment capacity, covenant headroom and investor trust.

5. CFO Framework for Issuer Readiness

Issuer readiness is the capability to enter the market with a financing proposition that is strategically justified, creditworthy, executable and governable. Figure 1 presents a closed-loop model in which strategy, financial preparation, structuring, execution, liquidity management and governance are connected. The first gate is the financing purpose. Debt should fund assets, acquisitions, working capital or refinancing whose cash-flow characteristics are understood. A CFO should reject vague rationales such as general corporate purposes when they conceal unresolved capital-allocation choices. The board paper should identify the use of proceeds, expected return, downside exposure, funding alternatives and impact on leverage capacity.



Figure 1: CFO debt-market readiness and persistence model

The second gate is financial readiness. At minimum, the company needs reliable audited statements, a forecast model reconciled to historical performance, transparent segment economics and a debt-capacity assessment. Profitability generally reduces reliance on external debt in GCC firms, while size and tangible assets increase borrowing capacity [12-21]. These relationships should be converted into company-specific measures: net debt to earnings, funds from operations to debt, interest cover, free cash flow after maintenance capital expenditure and secured-debt capacity.

The third gate is organisational readiness. Public issuance requires coordinated work across treasury, finance, legal, tax, risk, investor relations, operations and internal audit. Family-owned or closely controlled companies may need to strengthen delegation, board committees and related-party controls before investors will accept the desired pricing. ESG disclosure, analyst engagement and governance quality can affect external perceptions in GCC markets [13-23].

The fourth gate is rating preparedness. A rating is not merely a transaction document; it is an external test of business risk, financial policy and management credibility. The exercise should identify likely rating drivers, data gaps, peer comparisons and actions that could improve resilience. Management must also decide whether it is prepared to maintain a public rating through adverse periods, because withdrawal or deterioration can damage future access. The issuer should have selected preliminary legal structure, governing law, listing venue, currency, target tenor and documentation approach. A transaction that begins before these foundations are stable is likely to suffer delay, inconsistent disclosure or price concessions. Issuer readiness is achieved when the company can withstand investor questions and market volatility without changing its fundamental credit story.

6. Debt Structuring and Instrument Selection

Debt structuring converts the financing purpose into contractual cash flows and risk allocations. The cheapest headline coupon is not necessarily the lowest-cost solution. Fees, hedging, amortisation, security, covenants, refinancing exposure and loss of strategic flexibility must be included in the economic comparison. Bank loans remain appropriate where funding needs are confidential, relatively small, revolving or likely to require amendments. Their limitations are concentration, repricing exposure and the risk that several facilities mature together. Private placements provide a middle path: documentation and investor engagement can be tailored, while tenor may exceed ordinary bank facilities.

Public conventional bonds provide broad investor access, visible pricing and scalable repeat issuance. They are most effective when the issuer has a recognisable credit profile, clear disclosure and sufficient transaction size. Sukuk can widen demand among Islamic investors and fit Saudi market conventions, but asset eligibility, ownership interests, purchase undertakings and Shariah governance must be resolved early [16]. The choice between sukuk and bonds should consider investor base, documentation, tax, asset availability and ongoing operational obligations, not symbolism.

Short-term instruments such as commercial paper can improve working-capital efficiency and create an additional funding channel. They should not finance long-lived assets unless supported by committed back-up facilities and conservative rollover assumptions. Long-term finance reduces refinancing frequency, and research demonstrates that liquidity shocks can materially affect access to long-horizon funding [17]. A maturity extension may therefore justify a higher coupon when it protects the investment programme from near-term market closure. Riyal debt aligns naturally with domestic cash flows and avoids foreign-exchange risk. International currencies may offer larger investor pools or longer tenors, but unhedged exposure can transform a financing decision into a currency speculation. Where revenue is naturally linked to a foreign currency, the CFO should document the stability and enforceability of that hedge.

Covenants should protect investors without disabling management. Financial covenants, negative pledges, limitations on disposals, change-of-control provisions and information undertakings must be tested against the strategy and downside model. Excessively loose documentation can weaken pricing discipline and investor confidence, while excessively restrictive terms can force renegotiation during ordinary business volatility. Sustainability-labelled debt is valuable only where the company has measurable eligible expenditure or credible performance targets. Sustainability-linked structures can preserve general use of proceeds but create coupon consequences if targets are missed. The CFO should insist on baseline integrity, material metrics, external verification and board ownership.

Table 1: CFO issuer-readiness and resilience dashboard

Dimension	Board and CFO evidence question	Core measures	Escalation indicators
Strategic case	Is the borrowing linked to a defined use, return case and alternative funding analysis?	Use-of-proceeds coverage; project return; funding mix; leverage envelope	Debt funds recurring cash deficits; return below funding cost; unclear ownership of benefits
Financial capacity	Can the company service debt through a realistic downside scenario?	Net debt/earnings; interest cover; free cash flow; secured-debt capacity	Thin covenant headroom; weak cash conversion; forecast volatility; unverified adjustments
Rating and disclosure	Can management sustain a consistent public credit story?	Audit timeliness; forecast accuracy; rating headroom; data-room completeness	Conflicting disclosures; late reporting; dependence on one executive; unresolved related parties
Liquidity and refinancing	Can all obligations be met without assuming continuous market access?	Liquidity coverage; committed facilities; 12/24-month maturities; stress losses	Bullet concentration; uncommitted back-up; restricted cash; late refinancing start
Governance and controls	Are decisions, covenants and continuing obligations owned after closing?	Board limits; covenant testing; investor calendar; internal-audit findings	Generic borrowing authority; unclear escalation; missed reporting; weak trustee or Shariah oversight

Table 2: Comparative instrument-selection framework for Saudi corporate issuers

Instrument	Best-fit use	Principal advantages	Key readiness conditions
Bank loan / revolving facility	Flexible working capital, bridges, confidential or smaller funding needs	Negotiable terms; amendment flexibility; rapid execution	Bank capacity, security headroom, covenant control and repricing tolerance
Private placement	Mid-sized or tailored long-term funding	Custom tenor and documentation; targeted investors	Strong information package, negotiated covenants and concentrated-holder management
Public sukuk	Scalable domestic or regional issuance with Islamic investor reach	Broad investor base; established Saudi market relevance; repeat-issuance potential	Eligible structure or assets, Shariah governance, public disclosure and sufficient issue size
Public conventional bond	Benchmark financing and international diversification	Visible pricing, broad institutional access and longer tenor	Rating readiness, credible disclosure, hedging plan and continuing market engagement
Commercial paper / short-term sukuk	Working-capital and seasonal liquidity	Low execution friction after programme establishment	Committed back-up lines, conservative rollover limits and short-duration asset matching
Sustainability-labelled or linked debt	Eligible green/social expenditure or material performance targets	Investor diversification and internal performance discipline	Robust baseline, measurable targets, verification, allocation reporting and board ownership

7. Liquidity Planning and Refinancing Resilience

The CFO framework therefore treats liquidity planning as part of structuring rather than an activity delegated to treasury after settlement. Corporate cash holdings in GCC companies respond to macroeconomic conditions, financing frictions and adjustment dynamics [20]. The first component is a minimum-liquidity standard. Management should determine the cash and undrawn committed facilities required to cover operating volatility, debt service, maintenance capital expenditure and plausible contingencies. Cash held in restricted accounts, illiquid subsidiaries or foreign jurisdictions should not be treated as freely available without adjustment.

The second component is the maturity ladder. All loans, bonds, sukuk, leases, guarantees and put options should be consolidated into a single calendar. The board should set limits for debt maturing in any twelve-month and twenty-four-month period. Large bullet maturities may be efficient for stable issuers, but they create binary refinancing exposure. Amortising profiles, sinking funds or staged maturities can reduce that exposure, particularly for project-linked cash flows.

The third component is stress testing. Forecasts should include higher benchmark rates, wider credit spreads, delayed projects, lower earnings, working-capital absorption and restricted market access. A revenue shock can weaken leverage metrics, reduce ratings headroom and increase refinancing costs at the same time. Research on cash holdings, financial distress and capital adjustment reinforces the need to examine dynamic rather than isolated ratios [20-30].

The fourth component is a refinancing trigger framework. Triggers can include a remaining-tenor threshold, market spread level, rating outlook, covenant buffer or liquidity coverage ratio. When a trigger is reached, management must evaluate pre-funding, tender offers, exchanges, bank take-outs or partial amortisation. Pre-funding has a carrying cost, but that cost may be rational where investment commitments or market volatility make certainty valuable. The fifth component is contingency funding. Committed revolving facilities should be sized, documented and tested for draw conditions. Back-up lines are particularly important where commercial paper, short-term sukuk or bridge financing is used. A company can appear liquid under a base case but encounter a rapid cash drain if rates, currencies or commodity prices move sharply.

Investors are more willing to hold and trade securities when they believe the issuer can meet obligations without distressed refinancing. At market level, a population of issuers that manages maturities proactively is less likely to create sudden supply, forced exchanges or credit events that damage confidence across the Saudi curve.

8. Governance, Disclosure and Investor Confidence

Debt governance begins with the board's financial risk appetite. Directors should approve leverage ranges, minimum liquidity, permitted instruments, hedging parameters, security limits and maturity concentration. These limits need sufficient precision to guide management while allowing execution across market conditions. The board audit or risk committee should review forecast integrity, covenant compliance and rating sensitivity. Treasury reports must reconcile contractual debt, accounting classifications and management measures. Internal audit should periodically test controls over payments, covenant calculations, investor disclosure and use-of-proceeds reporting.

Ownership structure influences governance. Concentrated shareholders may support long-term decisions and rapid approvals, but investors may be concerned about distributions, related-party transfers or preferential treatment. GCC evidence links board composition, ownership and managerial entrenchment to payout and cash policies [25-28]. Issuers seeking institutional demand should demonstrate independent challenge, conflict management and a clear ranking of creditor claims.

Disclosure should be organised around the credit story rather than treated as a compliance checklist. Investors need understandable information on strategy, earnings, cash conversion, capital expenditure, liquidity, debt maturity, security, contingent liabilities and governance. The company should explain changes in leverage and not merely report them. Consistency across financial statements, presentations, rating materials and exchange announcements is essential. Investor relations for debt differs from equity communication. Bondholders focus on downside protection, cash preservation, structural subordination and refinancing. The CFO should maintain a creditor calendar that includes results calls, covenant certificates, rating reviews, non-deal roadshows and maturity updates. Silence in difficult periods increases speculation and can damage secondary liquidity.

Trustees, agents and Shariah advisers also form part of governance. Their responsibilities, information rights and escalation processes should be defined before issuance. For sukuk, Shariah approval must be embedded in the transaction and monitored where operational actions could affect compliance. For sustainability-labelled instruments, verification and allocation reporting should be assigned to named executives and reviewed by the board. Strong governance produces market-level benefits. Comparable disclosure lowers due-diligence costs, credible covenants improve investor protection and reliable reporting supports valuation. OECD analysis emphasises that debtholder rights and board duties become increasingly important as companies rely more on bond finance [9]. Saudi market depth will therefore depend on governance reforms inside issuers as much as on trading technology or listing rules.

9. Market-Development Priorities under Vision 2030

A CFO framework can improve individual transactions, but public policy and market institutions determine whether those transactions accumulate into a deep market. The first priority is to expand the issuer pipeline. Regulators, exchanges, banks and advisers can provide readiness programmes for companies with suitable scale but limited market experience. These programmes should focus on audited data, governance, ratings, treasury capability and documentation rather than on promotional introductions to investors.

The second priority is proportional access. Fixed issuance costs disadvantage mid-sized firms. Standardised documentation, efficient approvals and appropriately designed private-placement or qualified-investor segments can reduce barriers without weakening investor protection. Comparative market evidence suggests that growth-company access improves when regulation recognises different issuer stages while preserving disclosure quality [8].

The third priority is secondary liquidity. More electronic access, transparent post-trade information, market-making incentives and securities-lending arrangements can improve tradability. Liquidity should be measured at instrument level through turnover, bid–ask spreads, trade frequency and holder concentration. Listing value alone is insufficient. Regular reopening of benchmark lines can create larger fungible issues and improve price discovery.



Figure 2: Funding-option prioritisation by investor reach, tenor potential and execution complexity

The fourth priority is investor diversification. Banks will remain central, but pension funds, insurers, asset managers, family offices and international investors should have reasons to participate across the curve. This requires suitable credit research, custody, settlement, hedging instruments and risk-based investment rules. A broader investor base reduces dependence on a small group of buy-and-hold institutions and supports demand during different market cycles.

The fifth priority is a credible credit-information ecosystem. Ratings, audited reporting, covenant databases and default or restructuring experience help investors price risk. Saudi Arabia can also encourage more public discussion of recovery, security and structural subordination. A market that reports only successful issuance cannot develop a complete credit culture. Debtholder rights must remain enforceable before and during distress [9].

The sixth priority is integration of conventional and Islamic markets. Parallel liquidity pools can fragment pricing if economically similar instruments are not comparable. Harmonised disclosure of cash-flow ranking, security, maturity and issuer credit can allow investors to assess bonds and sukuk on a consistent basis while respecting structural differences. Strong Shariah governance should increase confidence rather than add ambiguity.

Finally, sovereign and corporate market development should be coordinated without crowding out. The 2025 borrowing plan illustrates the Kingdom's systematic approach to funding and risk management [5]. Predictable sovereign issuance can support benchmark curves, while corporate issuers add credit spread, sector and structural diversity. The objective is a market in which companies can finance productive growth through cycles, not a temporary increase in issuance volume.

10. DISCUSSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

The evidence supports a central proposition: issuer quality is the missing link between capital-market reform and sustainable corporate borrowing. Regulation can create access, but only company-level discipline can convert access into repeat issuance. This explains why some markets grow rapidly in outstanding value while remaining narrow in issuer diversity and trading liquidity. The proposed framework addresses the supply side of market development by making debt readiness a permanent corporate capability.

For CFOs, implementation should begin with an annual funding and resilience review. The review should map strategy, capital expenditure, acquisitions, dividends, working capital and existing maturities over at least five years. It should compare internal cash, bank capacity and market instruments under base and downside cases. The output should be a board-approved funding envelope, not a commitment to issue immediately.

A readiness dashboard should then track financial and organisational metrics. Financial measures include leverage, interest cover, free cash flow, liquidity coverage, secured debt and maturity concentration. Organisational measures include audit timeliness, forecast accuracy, covenant-control testing, data-room completeness, rating actions and investor-engagement activity. Table 1 converts the evidence into a concise operating dashboard.

Instrument decisions should be documented through a total-cost and risk comparison. The analysis must include fees, hedging, carry, covenant value, collateral usage and refinancing exposure. A slightly more expensive long-term instrument may be superior if it protects strategic flexibility. Conversely, a public issue may not be justified where transaction size is small or disclosure readiness is weak. The framework does not privilege bonds over loans or sukuk over conventional instruments; it privileges alignment.

Governance should be embedded through clear decision rights. Treasury prepares the analysis, finance validates forecasts, legal controls documentation, risk challenges assumptions, and the board approves policy and material transactions. Investor relations owns the continuing communication calendar, while internal audit tests compliance. This division prevents the issuance team from dissolving after closing and leaving obligations without ownership.

At national level, the framework offers a common language for readiness programmes, rating discussions and investor assessment. Companies can use the stages to identify gaps before incurring transaction costs. Regulators and advisers can use them to design targeted capacity building. Investors can use them to distinguish issuers that have built durable funding institutions from those pursuing opportunistic leverage.

The framework also clarifies the relationship between debt and Vision 2030. Debt supports transformation when it funds productive assets, extends financial capacity and imposes discipline. It weakens transformation when it finances structural cash deficits, masks poor capital allocation or creates concentrated refinancing obligations. Market development should therefore be evaluated through issuer resilience, investment outcomes, liquidity and governance, not issuance volume alone.

11. Limitations and Future Research

This review has three limitations. First, public Saudi corporate debt data remain less granular than data available in mature markets. Instrument-level turnover, holder concentration, covenant terms and recovery experience are not always available in a form suitable for systematic comparison. Second, the academic evidence frequently uses GCC or emerging-market samples. Institutional mechanisms are relevant, but estimated relationships may not transfer uniformly across Saudi sectors and ownership structures. Third, the review develops a conceptual framework rather than testing its effect on spreads, ratings or default outcomes.

Future research should build a transaction-level Saudi dataset linking issuer characteristics, structure, pricing, allocation, secondary liquidity and post-issuance performance. Comparative analysis of conventional bonds and sukuk would clarify whether structural differences affect spreads, investor breadth or resilience. Studies should also examine family ownership, state participation, board independence and disclosure quality as determinants of market access. Finally, researchers could test whether companies applying formal readiness and liquidity gates achieve lower all-in funding costs, longer maturities or better rating stability.

12. CONCLUSION

Saudi Arabia can strengthen its corporate debt market by combining market reform with disciplined issuer development. The most important unit of progress is not the individual bond or sukuk; it is the company capable of returning to the market with a coherent strategy, reliable disclosure and resilient liquidity. The CFO framework developed in this review links that capability to four areas: readiness, structuring, liquidity and governance.

Issuer readiness requires a clear financing purpose, credible forecasts, rating capacity, organisational coordination and execution discipline. Structuring must align currency, tenor, amortisation, security, covenants and sustainability features with the economics of the funded activity. Liquidity planning must cover minimum resources, maturity concentration, stress scenarios and early refinancing triggers. Governance must ensure board oversight, consistent disclosure, creditor engagement and continuing accountability after closing.

These practices also support national objectives. Better prepared issuers expand the investable universe, improve pricing comparability and reduce the risk of disruptive refinancing.

Stronger disclosure and debtholder protection attract institutional investors, while repeat issuance and larger benchmark lines can improve secondary liquidity. Conventional bonds and sukuk can develop together when investors receive comparable information on credit, ranking and cash flows.

Vision 2030 requires financing institutions that endure beyond individual projects and market windows. A corporate debt market built around responsible repeat issuers can mobilise domestic savings, diversify funding and impose useful capital discipline. Its success should be measured not only by issuance totals, but by the quality of investment financed, the resilience of issuers, the breadth of participation and the confidence maintained through changing economic conditions.

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